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Abstract. The financial crisis has demonstrated that self-regulation 
is not sufficient to markets and financial institutions with systemic 
importance. 
Permissive regulatory policies, allowing the development speed of 
global banking financial system, have played an important role in 
emphasizing the upward slope of the financial crisis. 
The new regulations known as Basel III framework aimed the 
strengthening of prudential capital and liquidity of financial institutions 
and create a stronger banking and financial system more resilient to 
shocks. 
Basel III is trying to eliminate the shortcomings of Basel II, by 
more extensive rules on integrated risk management in banking and 
financial environment. 
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The new set of regulations known as Basel III, approaches in an 
integrated manner the risks issue and its complexity, focusing on aspects that 
were highlighted by the actual financial crisis, with clear role for gradual 
implementation and performance and value creation added to the whole 
banking and financial system. The new provisions establish core capital ratio to 
4.5%, double of the current level of 2%, plus a liquidity surplus of 2.5%. We 
appreciate that capitalized banks will fit in a buffer of liquidity, but will be new 
approaches for payment of dividends and bonuses. The new rules will be 
implemented from January 2013 and it is estimated that the process will end by 
January 2019. 
 
Reforms target 
  Micro-prudentiality, which will help increase the resilience of 
individual banks in times of stress; 
  Macro-prudentiality, system wide risks that can develop in the banking 
sector and cyclical amplification of these risks over time. 
 
Micro-prudentiality vs. Macro-prudentiality 
 
Micro-prudentiality policies are those directed to insure health of 
individual financial institutions. Micro-prudentiality reform focuses on risk 
control in an intermediate frame, reducing but not eliminating the possibility of 
failure. 
Regulatory instruments may be similar when it comes to micro and macro 
prudentiality, but macro-prudentiality policy applies them differently. For 
example, regulatory capital requirements would increase the contribution to 
systemic risk. This contribution depends on the intermediate interconnection 
and on the risks level translated into institutions' balance sheet risk, and is often 
correlated with size. To be effective in limiting the systemic threats, a surcharge 
of regulatory capital will probably increase more than proportionally the 
likelihood of systemic risk. 
To counteract systemic risk, prudential regulators also may require pro-
cyclical capital requirements. Thus, capital requirements would increase to 
create a capital buffer against adverse shocks. 
Basel III highlights new aspects of integrated risk management banking, 
in a global regulatory framework, but with significant local impact over the 
banks’ strength to shock waves. It addresses in a comprehensive manner risks 
generated by capital market transactions but also the capital diversification and 
its quality issues, in order to cover risks not sufficiently considered in the 
previous agreement or inefficient covered by capital requirements. Basel III – Between Global Thinking and Local Acting 
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Some important indicators were reconfigured: 
  Liquidity coverage ratio was lowered: the run-off
(1) rate was reduced, 
and available funding period for long term lending rate (net stable 
funding ratio)
(2) was extended. 
  Leverage ratio: the minimum required considered adequately is 3%. 
Multiplier effects will be monitored over four years, starting in January 
2013, and new regulations will be implemented in January 2018. 
  Tier1 capital ratio: less stringent rules for exclusion, intangible assets 
(e.g. software) and deferred tax assets (net DTA) were removed from 
the list of exclusions of the based capital ratio required; deferred tax 
assets (net) and investments in shares of financial institutions (the limit 
is 10% of component shares of the bank) were partially reintroduced. 
  Gradual introduction period is about eight years. Application of new 
rules on liquidity coverage ratio and leverage will begin in January 
2018. 
Regarding liquidity, Basel III objectives are clearly formulated: to 
increase the liquid assets proportion held by banks and to reduce short-term 
financing. These objectives will cause banks to stop using models adopted from 
1970-1980, when the models for the management of liabilities were 
implemented. New models of asset management will be adopted, so the size of 
the balance sheet will be determined by all financial resources that the bank 
may increase (liabilities), and the total assets will be adjusted to match available 
liabilities. Thus, a macro-prudential
(3) policy is implemented. 
Banks will be forced to Tier1 capital rate from 2% to 7% in 2019. This 
report is a good measure against potential losses for banks. Under this 
interpretation of the new Basel III, there are different arguments for 
implementation in the banking community. 
Below we highlight a few elements that can be interpreted as a response 
to the Basel III, given by banks and by regulatory authorities. 
 
1. Capital 
 
One of the new requirements of Basel III is the restructuring of the capital 
levels that banks use to solve the problem of minimizing possible losses. 
 
2. Bail-ins 
 
Bail-ins
(4) are a direct response of Basel III to the credit crisis and must be 
regarded as a gap, before a bank to be rescued by authorities/taxpayers, by 
liquidity injection. Reducing funding for short-term loans, in close agreement Vasile Dedu, Dan Costin Nițescu 
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with attracting deposits to reduce capital inadequacies, tends to be significant 
and may actually represent a physical correction of bank balance. 
Basel III capital adequacy approach stems from the fact that, in the past, 
the stability of banks was generally measured only at the expense of capital 
levels and divides into the categories of risk assets weighted. We believe that 
banks that failed in the credit crisis may have had, no doubt, capital issues, but 
inevitably blocking was generated by the funding difficulties and also by 
liquidity problems. 
 
3. Impact on market 
 
The concentration of liquid assets of the commercial banks in government 
securities, the resultant of Basel III agreement, may lead to some disturbance in 
the economy. A solution would be to increase the possibility of banks to create 
liquid assets from other sources also, such as, for example, bills of exchange or 
other debt instruments. 
Banks need liquidity sources that allow them to adjust their cash flow 
fluctuations, according to requirements. Before the financial crisis, a large 
proportion of liquidity came from unsecured deposits from the interbank 
market, but this is less likely to provide the liquidity needed in future. Since the 
beginning of the financial crisis, central banks deposits have become the main 
source of liquidity. 
Considering the requirements for financial stability, possible liquidity 
crisis will have to be approached on integrated basis, by authorities reducing of 
the minimum rate of liquid assets, so that liquidity may be put into circulation 
and by central banks buying of a wide variety of eligible assets/extension of the 
collateral mix used. 
 
Models that can be applied in the context of Basel III 
 
When asked What impact may Basel III requirements have on 
performance and economic fluctuations?, in order to give an answer, some can 
use the tools of quantitative analysis. The methodology is based on appropriate 
scenarios of macroeconomic models. In essence, a version of a given scenario 
of new regulations is introduced in a model, entering input data and parameters 
and interpreting results, the equilibrium values (mean or mathematical 
expectation) and volatility (standard deviation) of macroeconomic variables. 
The most used models are the DSGE type (Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium). They are used due to the fact that they are the only hypothetical 
experiments (based on scenarios) allowing to be performed in a consistent Basel III – Between Global Thinking and Local Acting 
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manner. The VECM type models (Vector Error Correction Models) or “semi-
structural” can be used, but they can give a concise answer only about 
economic performance and not on the fluctuations in the economy. In the 
DSGE model type, bank balance and credit markets are modeled explicitly. 
Thus, it creates a unified framework to analyze how it affects capital 
requirements and bank liquidity conditions (spread and loan) and finally output. 
Moreover, the effects of policy change can be studied not only on the 
equilibrium value of economic variables, but also on long-term variability. 
Basically, we consider that three basic elements have changed in the new 
economic framework assumed by Basel III: increasing the minimum rate of 
capital, increasing the quality of the capital and liquidity requirements are more 
stringent. To quantify the impact of Basel III will have on performance and 
economic fluctuations, the three changes are required to be entered into a 
macroeconomic valid model. It should be considered that some models do not 
provide a characterization of bank liquidity or capital, or both. Moreover, even 
if the models would provide information about liquidity or capital, they are 
usually estimated or calibrated based rather on capital size than the TIER1 
capitalization level specified in Basel III agreement. 
 
Impact on the variability of output is determined using all type DSGE models. 
Basel III has introduced new rules on capital counter-cyclical requirements. To 
assess the effects of introducing a buffer to economic variability, we use models 
that take into account bank capital and capital requirements according to the 
dynamics of a key macroeconomic variables. Let’s consider the dynamic 
system: 
ut = (1-ρu)ū + (1-ρu)χu  Xt + ρu  ut-1 
where  
ut is targeted capital ratio at different times, ū is the equilibrium rate of 
capital. We define Xt as part of long-term credit report/income. ut's changes 
when Xt changes are given by the sensitivity parameter χu > 0. Parameter values 
are chosen ad hoc. In particular, set ρu = 0.9. Values of χu specific to the model 
we choose so as to produce reasonable changes of ut around his ū: a rate of  
±2% is considered reasonable. This is broadly in line with the level of 0 to 2.5% 
announced by the regulatory authorities for countercyclical capital buffers 
(Wellink, 2010, BCBS, 2010). Once the above equation is introduced in the 
model, unconditioned variances can be calculated and they may compared with 
the values recorded in the basic version of the model. 
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Models to quantify the EAD 
 
As the new Basel III is also a response to financial crisis of 2008, and as 
one of the factors that have brought the crisis was entered in default of debtors 
(EAD, Exposure-of-Default), we analyze the a model to quantify the risk of 
EAD. 
By Basel II agreement, banks were given two options to evaluate the 
necessary capital. The first is the standard approach, similar to that used in the 
Basel I, but the weights used are refined, provided by rating agencies. The 
second one is the approach based on internal ratings (IRB, Internal Rating 
Based), which allows banks to calculate capital requirements on their own 
methods. There are two sub-cases. First, the bank can calculate the probability 
of default (PD), but losses when counterparty goes bankrupt (LGD) are 
provided by experienced agencies (basic methodology). The second is the 
advanced methodology, which allows banks to calculate both PD and LGD. 
Unlike Basel I, Basel II refers to market risk (related to the uncertainty of 
future revenue due to changes of prices and effects of various market rates). 
Against this, Basel II proposed VaR, completed with IRB methods. 
With the new provisions, we consider that Basel III may improve VaR 
method. The main purpose is to increase capital reserves against counterparty 
credit risk, to reduce pro-cyclical trends and to provide incentives to move OTC 
derivatives market on the standard market, in order to reduce systemic risk on 
financial markets. Meeting these requirements requires more capital to the 
banks and thus increases the confidence level of banks' own economic capital 
models. The Basel III will be a stress test on the VaR, which will be calculated 
during the last financial crisis, which will increase the risk coefficients used by 
banks internal models to determine counterparty credit risk. Basel III extends 
the risk margin period from 10 days to 20 days for expected potential exposure 
to OTC derivatives. Incremental risk
(5) is calculated using the banking 
methodology, with a time horizon of less than one year, with 99.7% confidence 
level. 
 
Risk measurement using VaR 
 
This method is probably the most often used in financial institutions. VaR 
measures the risk of having a portfolio of risk assets for a period of time, Δ. The 
idea of VaR is to introduce confidence intervals in the equation and to define 
the maximum loss that will not be exceeded, with a high probability. However, 
the VaR results are sometimes interpreted too precisely, which may harm. 
Model’s risk is inherent in risk management models. This risk occurs when the Basel III – Between Global Thinking and Local Acting 
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model is not specified correctly or when some of the basic assumptions are not 
true. To determine the economic capital, used to estimate VaR, it requires a 
high level of trust, which causes the risk of the model. VaR disregards market 
liquidity. A market is liquid if an investor can sell and buy a large quantity of 
securities in a short time without the price to be affected. Modeling the effects 
of a illiquid market is extremely difficult. The transition from liquid to the illiquid 
market is considered as part of market risk (Embrechts et al., 2005, p. 40). 
Specific to Basel I is current exposure method, based on VaR 
methodology. More important for the calculation of EAD are standardized 
methods (Standardized Models-SM), used by banks that did not meet the 
requirements to calculate the derivative exposure by themselves, but wanted a 
greater risk sensitivity than that provided by VaR. 
 
Exposure is calculated using the formula:  
EAD = β   max[CE, ∑j RPj  CCFj] 
where  
CE (current exposure) is the market value after reduction and 
compensation of guarantees, NRP are absolute values of net portfolio risk 
hedging and CCF are the credit conversion factors applied to these open 
positions. β factor is fixed by the authorities to 1.4 and is used as a reserve for 
potential extra-economic crisis and cover model risk. Standard models 
incorporate many of the key features offered by internal models method (IMM). 
Banks may choose to use their EAD calculation model at different times. SME 
is the most sensitive approach for calculating EAD risk, the work frame 
required under the Basel III (Gregory, 2010, p. 319). Exposure before the 
bankruptcy of the debtor, by SME, is:  
EAD = α  EPEactual 
where  
α is a multiplier set by the Basel III agreement and EPE actual is the 
actual expected positive exposure. α is a coefficient of correlation between 
market and credit risk, credit portfolio assumptions, concentration risk and 
model risk. 
 
SMEs have many advantages over non-internal methods. For example, it 
determines an average exposure and not necessarily that all transactions have 
the same maturity. In addition, keep in mind that the basic market factors, hence 
the value of derivatives, are not perfectly correlated, arguing the benefits of 
diversification. It should be also considered the transactions performed in 
opposite direction, eliminating the problem of double counting. Vasile Dedu, Dan Costin Nițescu 
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Conclusions 
 
The reform of counterparty risk in accordance with Basel III is 
specifically designed to improve systemic risk. This reform is a response to 
financial crisis of 2008. The regulatory framework agreed globally has 
significant influence within the activity of local banks and hence the local 
economies. Banks are in a complex exercise for making strategic decisions 
regarding the compliance policies and thus adapting to the customer segments 
and to the specific operations. However, proactive involvement of regulatory 
authorities in the acceptance liquidity coverage rate, including asset classes, 
might establish a formula widely accepted by financial markets banking. 
However, even with this new framework aimed to increase liquidity, to 
improve the quality of capital to cover risks, the integrated risk approach can 
not exclude the future emergence of other classes of vulnerabilities in the 
financial and banking systems. 
 
 
Notes 
 
(1)  Run-off - Monitoring index of attracted sources.  
(2)  Net stable funding ration – index that calculates the proportion of financed long-term assets. 
(3)  Macro-prudentiality, used as a concept for the first time in 1978 by Cooke Committee. 
(4)  Bail-ins - process in which corporate bonds can not be converted in equity. 
(5) Incremental  risk  includes the risk of  default and  migration  risk  for  securitized credit 
products. 
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